Blogroll

Tuesday, May 20, 2008

Daily Scold: Appeasing the security dilemma

Speaking before the Israeli parliament, George W. Bush denounced appeasement and compared current supporters of appeasement (he named no names, of course) to the likes of Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister who tried to avert World War II by giving Hitler whatever he wanted (Google "Munich agreement" for extra credit). Bush said an unconditional offer for direct talks to leaders such as Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, would amount to the same thing, or at least the same path. Now the Democrats had a field day, throwing what the The Weekly Standard called "the left's latest hissy fit," with Barack Obama leading the charge, blasting Bush for playing domestic politics overseas and for being plain wrong. John McCain shot right back, using Obama's name (Bush spokesmen repeatedly claimed that Bush did not aim his remarks at Obama or anyone in particular) directly, saying Obama "does not understand the world we live in."

But here's the problem: negotiation isn't appeasement. Appeasement is the part where you give the other guy the better deal, after you negotiate.

The Atlantic Monthly has characterized Obama's foreign-policy stance as being somewhat "accidental" -- that is to say, Obama blurted out his willingness to meet unconditionally with people like Iran's Ahmadinejad. There was no prior discussion.

Since then, Obama has put forth a forceful foreign policy statement that represents a significant departure from establishment Democratic thinking, which is basically, "talk as tough as the GOP or else you'll get owned by right-wing attacks saying you're too weak."

Obama rejects negotiations as a sign of weakness, quoting John F. Kennedy: "we should not negotiate out of fear, but we should also not fear to negotiate."

The conservatives say it's dangerous to talk to Ahmadinejad, or at the very least, meaningless. Iranian officials will proclaim a public relations victory and use the negotiations for domestic propaganda purposes, they say.

No, the better idea is to keep up the hardline approach. Prepare for the worst, don't engage directly, and make sure your demands are so high that the other side cannot possibly meet them without appearing to contradict their long-held position.

This is what I like to call the wrong answer to the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a concept in international relations that's relatively simple to understand: a bunch of nations want to be safe and secure. They don't want war. But they want to be protected, just in case. So they build up armies and weapons, invest large sums of money and effort into having the best military. After all, whoever's got the best military will be the best-prepared in case of enemy attack.

Simple, right? The problem is, the other nations feel the same way, and have reached the same conclusion. So what transpires is a three-way arms race between three nations that have no genuine desire for conflict. You can see how this situation might get out of hand. Angry statements are made by all sides as they accuse one another of warmongering by aggressively building up their military might.

The hardliners on each side say: "prepare for the worst, and don't trust anyone. Make sure your stick's the biggest." This continues the trap, forever fueling an escalating arms race AND fueling the cultural forces of fear, nationalism and hostility towards other nations. These cultural feelings are politically convenient, as they provide public will and support for continuing the military buildup.

Finally, there actually IS a desire on the part of one party to attack. Say preemptively, because one of the other nations has boosted its hostile rhetoric and now has a nuclear arsenal so powerful that, while there is no evidence it intends to attack, the only "smoking gun will be a mushroom cloud," to paraphrase George W. Bush.

This is merely a nightmarish hypothetical, of course -- Iran is years away from a working nuclear weapon that can strike U.S. soil. But adopting the sort of "don't talk, be tough, make them break first" attitude is exactly how you fall into the trap.

It's an easy trap to fall into, as it's easy to win public support for something that will "best prepare" the country in case of enemy attack. But I'd rather take my chances with the guy who's willing to bypass the trap entirely. Let's not forget that without last-minute dialogue and diplomacy, the Cuban Missile Crisis would've resulted in a nuclear conflagration whose radioactive embers would still glow brightly on the streets of Washington D.C. today.

3 comments:

Horace J. Johnson, staff writer said...

All due respect to our editor, but this story is such bullcrap.

Kennedy did negotiate with Kruschev, but he had like 5,000 Army divisions ready to invade Cuba after it got bombed to hell by the 10,000 bombers he had ready to go in at a moment's notice.

Obama is talking about negotiating without any of these mechanisms in place. And let's face it, the mullahs and Grand Ayatollah and Ahmadinejad himself have made it clear they will never stop their nuclear program.

Negotiation, direct or otherwise, can have only two out comes. 1.) they fail, no agreement is made, and we're back to square one, except the Iranians get parade clips of that meeting to their people to prove they've forced America to the table. Or 2.) WE bite the bullet and hand over technology, aid and money to these zealous state sponsors of terrorism, in exchange for them stopping their nuclear program.

Either way we look weak. Better to stonewall these people, convince everyone else we've got to stop Iran from getting the bomb (that's a much easier case to make to our allies than to Ahmadinejad), and take preemptive force if we need to, exactly like Kennedy was ready to.

Anonymous said...

Also it is worth mentioning that Kennedy negotiated with Kruschev IN SECRET unlike what Obama proposes.

Really there is no comparison at all to what Obama wants to do vs. what Kennedy did.

Jeremy Spalt, staff writer said...

Chuck Hagel said it best: "I never understand how anyone in any realm of civilized discourse could sort through the big issues and challenges and threats and figure out how to deal with those without engaging in some way..."

He continued: "You take some risks in talking about this, especially in the Congress, because you can immediately be branded as an appeaser."

"If you engage a world power or a rival, it doesn't mean you agree with them or subscribe with what they believe or you support them in any way," he said. "What it does tell you is that you've got a problem you need to resolve. And you've got to understand the other side and the other side has got to understand you."